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A CRITIQUE OF EMERGENT DUALISM 
Frank B. Dilley 
In this paper I examine and critique the "Emergent Dualism" of William 
Hasker, suggesting that Cartesian dualism provides a more appropriate 
vehicle for the kind of self Hasker rightly claims is needed to do justice to 
human consciousness. 
Accepting his critique of materialism and of supervenience theories, I 
argue that Hasker by attributing spatiality and energy to the self undercuts 
the basic historic arguments for separating mind from body because of the 
incompatibility of those qualities with the nonphysical ones needed for the 
kind of self he defends, and because his view leads unacceptably to the pos-
sibility of multiple selves. 
I further claim by paying proper attention to the structure of the self and 
the mutual structuring of each other by minds and bodies, some of the diffi-
culties of Cartesian dualism may be reduced. 
Materialists have always hoped to solve the problem of consciousness by 
denying that the data of consciousness have been correctly described, but 
since the "what it is like" problem will not go away, some philosophers of 
mind have moved as far as property dualism to accommodate this prob-
lem. Many property dualists, though they resigned themselves to giving 
up free will and responsibility, as well as a unified self which persists 
through time, hoped at least to be able to retain mental causation without 
becoming substance dualists, but this attempt has failed. 
Recently, there have been some hopeful signs that philosophers are 
ready to take substance dualism more seriously. To save mental causation, 
Jaegwon Kim claims, would require substantival dualism.1 Thomas Nagel 
now postulates rationality as a basic feature of the universe and of the 
human mind, though still remaining passionately opposed to theism.2 
John Searle, though still a materialist, very recently changed his mind on a 
number of issues, and now defends a non-Humean self with free will and 
rationality, also endorsing biological indeterminism.3 Also, some promi-
nent scientists have begun to reexamine the physical and psychological 
evidence which supports mental causation.' Perhaps now is a good time to 
reassert substance dualism once more. 
This paper is a tribute to and critique of the views of William Hasker in 
The Emergent Self Hasker advocates a mind-brain view which goes 
beyond materialism and property dualism.5 His view is that the self 
emerges from matter: that it appears when matter reaches an appropriate 
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level of complexity. Hasker thinks that his view can provide for mental 
causation and libertarian free will, which property dualists deny, but that it 
can also provide for a unified self, an advance over Panpsychist and 
Process views which offer a serial self, not a persisting and unitary self. 
He calls his view "emergent dualism," rejecting traditional dualism but 
claiming that his view can do the things that traditional dualism attempted 
to do, namely support mental causation, rationality, free will, the unity of 
the self, and survival of physical death, while avoiding what he takes to be 
the difficulties with more familiar forms of substance dualism. According 
to Hasker, traditional substance dualisms fail to integrate well with evolu-
tionary theory and with recent discoveries about the dependence of mind 
on brain. He is, of course, correct on these matters but dualists can say 
more in response to these problems than he acknowledges. 
HASKER'S EMERGENT DUALISM 
The positive exposition of Hasker's view, emergent dualism, alas, is given 
only the briefest of presentations - fifteen pages, nine in his chapter on 
Emergent Dualism and five in his chapter on Survival - so it is no wonder 
that questions about his view might arise. Presumably Hasker will have 
much more to say about his positive views, but some grave problems arise 
from what he has written. I applaud his critique of materialism and prop-
erty dualism, but regret his decision to stop short of Cartesian dualism, 
and claim that the latter view is needed to support the basic features of the 
mental self that Hasker wishes to preserve. 
Hasker claims that in the course of evolutionary development, an indi-
vidual mind, not just a set of mental properties, has emerged from the 
brain, a mind with properties different from those in the physical brain and 
world but which acts on that material world. He refers to the mind as an 
emergent individual, likening it to a magnetic field in its qualitative differ-
ence from the physical properties that generate it and also in its ability to 
act on the brain that generates it. Although property dualists would share 
his view that mental states are something over and above the brain states 
that produce them, they would reject his view that the mind is an individ-
ual thing, acts causally on the brain, and is libertarianly free. 
Other substance dualists maintain that the mind exists independently of 
the body, but Hasker disagrees. His view is that mind is generated by 
physical matter and is kept in existence by that matter. He does allow that 
mind might possibly continue to exist once it has been produced, but 
chooses to defend the view that survival of death depends upon God's 
supporting mind directly or producing another body to sustain it. 
He differs from those theistic dualists who think that God creates souls 
separately and binds them to bodies. For Hasker, souls come from matter, 
though of course it is God who gives matter the potentiality for producing 
souls. Cartesian dualists can accommodate to the idea that God endows 
matter with the power to produce souls, but unfortunately Hasker pro-
poses other revisions to the concept of mind which cause serious prob-
lems, as I will show. 
Hasker himself realizes that his analogy of physical fields has limita-
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tions, chief among them that the properties of a magnetic field or other 
fields identified by physics are not "emergent in the strong sense required 
for the properties of the mind. Nor does it seem that these fields possess 
the kind of unity that is required for the mind.... And there is no reason to 
suppose that the fields of physics are endowed with inherent teleology, 
much less libertarian freedom" (p 192). It seems to me that Hasker owes us 
something in the way of providing some guidance on how he hopes to 
overcome these deficiencies in his model, since those three features of 
mind, its qualitative difference from the brain, its unity, and its ability to 
act teleologically are all central to the nature of the self that he advocates. 
Moreover he makes matters worse by extending some of the features of 
physical fields, namely spatial location and energy, to mind itself, raising 
serious questions about the coherence of his view. 
Since I accept his reasons for rejecting materialism and property dual-
ism, I will restrict myself to topics relevant to my exposition and critique of 
his position, and will then argue that Cartesian dualism is needed to sus-
tain the properties that he deems essentiaL If my claims about his views are 
correct, he has attributed contradictory properties to the emergent self. If 
so, his view fails to do what he wants it to do. Also I think that Cartesian 
dualism is capable of giving more adequate answers to the criticisms that 
he raises than he recognizes. 
THE INADEQUACY OF MATERIALISM 
Hasker argues that materialism is implausible because the data of con-
sciousness, including qualia, mental content and intentionality, cannot be 
reduced to physical properties. This is what has been called "the explana-
tory gap" or "the qualitative gap" between the qualities of matter and 
mind. Analytical behaviorism, he says, is almost dead, and he does not 
think that functionalism adequately handles qualia, mental content and 
intentionality. Supervenience theories are more promising, but cannot 
provide for real mental causation. As I have noted, Kim has reached the 
same conclusion about supervenience theories and mental causation. 
Besides mental causation, the unity of consciousness must be provided 
for, both the unity of consciousness at a time and the unity of conscious-
ness over time. Simply stated, Hasker argues that "a person's being aware 
of a complex object cannot consist of parts of the person being aware of 
parts of the object" (p 146). Since there is no place in the brain where all my 
states of awareness are brought together (the so-called binding problem), 
many philosophers, including property dualists, have adopted Hume's 
position that the unity of consciousness is a fiction. Since Hasker admits 
that his field analogy also does not provide the kind of unity needed, he 
has a problem. I question whether a field can provide a home for the sub-
ject of consciousness, the subject which unifies its experiences of the vari-
ous objects of which it is aware. 
Hasker explores reasons for thinking that the physical causal order is not 
closed, one of which he calls the argument from reason. He repeats the fre-
quently made criticism that if the physical order is closed then "no one ever 
accepts a belief because it is supported by good reasons" (p 68). Rationality and 
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agency go along with free will and teleology, so for all these reasons Hasker 
defends the need for an individual soul which has unity of consciousness. 
Midway through the book he summarizes his conclusions as to what 
qualities the self has. He claims that rationality involves teleological consid-
erations and the notion of a whole self "since we cannot reasonably suppose 
the behavior of elementary particles to be influenced directly by norms and 
objectives," "that the choices in virtue of which we are agents must also be 
ascribed to the person in a holistic sense," and "that the self which is the 
subject of conscious experience must be a unity of a sort that is inconsistent 
with its being a whole consisting of physical parts"(p 146). He turns to the 
consideration of what kind of self meets these requirements, supporting an 
emergent self and rejecting Cartesian and Thomistic dualism. My argument 
will be that the self he proposes cannot provide either the kind of unity he 
requires or accommodate qualia, intentions, rationality and free will. 
Considering survival, he offers three possibilities consistent with his 
view that the self is a product of the material body. It might be, he says, 
that once the soul emerges it can continue to exist on its own, even though 
it is produced and sustained by its physical body all during its normal life. 
The other two options are that God takes over the task of sustaining the 
field or that God creates a new body to take over that task. He recognizes 
the timing problem in the third option, lest the new body generate its own 
field before the old one is attached to it. The self has to be the same old one 
because "re-creationism is a conceptual absurdity" (p 113). However, since 
fields can be split, he admits that it is possible on his view that there can be 
multiple selves, which counters our ordinary intuitions that the self is not 
capable of multiplicity, objectionable on the logical ground that two centers 
of consciousness, numerically different, can't possibly be the same self. 
HASKER'S VIEW OF THE SELF EXAMINED 
The first question is, given his admission about the limitations of his physi-
cal field analogy, is Hasker's self sufficiently dualistic to give him what he 
wants, the kind of self that can support qualia, intentional states, causality, 
contra-causally free will and unity of consciousness? Just how dualistic is 
his position? He calls his view "emergent dualism" (pp 121, 196, 201), 
says it is a form of "substance dualism" (p 147), describes his view as that 
of "subject-emergence" rather than property-emergence (p 170), and says 
that interactions between minds and bodies are interactions between two 
distinct substances (pp 199, 200). Clearly he thinks of himself as a sub-
stance dualist, but not as a Cartesian or Thomistic substance dualist. 
Cartesian dualism, Hasker says, is defined in terms of two elements, the 
relation between the qualities of mind and the qualities of the brain, and 
the origin of mind. As has been made clear already, Hasker rejects the 
independence of the soul from the body - the brain creates and sustaill.S 
the soul- but how does he stand on the other element of traditional dual-
ism, the view that human "minds, or souls, are completely nonphysical; 
they possess no mass, extension, or location" (p 147)? Is Hasker's self 
"completely" nonphysical? That is not so clear. Consider what he has to 
say about Haskerian minds. 
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He has already conceded that one of the defects of his physical field 
analogy is that it does not allow emergence "in the strong sense required 
for the properties of the mind" (p 192). For Hasker, the differences between 
mental and physical qualities are not nearly as strong as Cartesians would 
make them. But that is not the major problem, the major problem is the 
qualities Hasker assigns to minds. 
In the first place, the mind, for Hasker, is spatial, "emergent conscious-
ness is itself a spatial entity," and, "the volume of space within which the 
emergent mind exists must be at least sufficient to encompass those parts of 
the brain with which the mind interacts" (p 192). In another place, in dis-
cussing the possibility of telekinesis, he suggests that mind might interact 
with other parts of the material world outside the brain and thus include 
them as well (p 191). If telepathy occurs, the space occupied by mind might 
be quite vast indeed. 
Secondly, in discussing how minds and brains interact, he offers an 
even more dangerous, suggestion. He suggests that mind-brain interac-
tions involve an "exchange of energy between mind and brain"(p 201). He 
predicts that this suggestion will tempt critics to claim that if this is true 
then mind becomes physical, but responds that this resolves into a mere 
matter of names. "If philosophers are prepared to stretch the meaning of 
'physical' to encompass everything that has been said here about the field 
of consciousness, then so be it. What is not acceptable, however, is for 
someone to take the claim, thus arrived at, that 'the mind is physical' and 
use it as a premise from which to infer characteristics of the conscious 
mind that are contrary to the ones postulated in this chapter" (p 201). The 
trouble is that two qualities he included in this chapter were spatialloca-
tion and energy to exchange with the brain and perhaps other material 
objects, two properties denied to mind by most philosophers who have 
made the logical irreducibility argument. 
For Hasker, the contents of the mind include qualia and other mental 
states and processes which are not subject to reduction to brain processes or 
brain waves, but now he adds that the mind is spatial and has energy. 
Something seems amiss when elements like spatiality and energy and qualia 
and rationality are combined. Haskell defends the "logical irreducibility" of 
mind to brain (pp 125-35), but if mind has energy and also spatial location, 
Hasker has the same problem as the materialists whom he rejects. Can these 
qualities of mind be combined with spatiality and with being an energy sys-
tem? Philosophers of many persuasions have agreed that mind and brain 
cannot be identical because those qualities cannot be combined. 
Historically, one of the major reasons for defending mental properties is 
that qualia and other states of consciousness cannot be found anywhere in 
the physical world. Brain waves are not colored but some states of con-
sciousness are. Moreover, mental states cannot be located by external 
observers and are not publicly accessible. Another reason for adding mind 
to brain is that mental processes operate differently from brain processes 
- mental processes are semantic and intensional but brain processes can 
only be mechanical and syntactic. These arguments are bellwether argu-
ments for mind brain separation and seemingly were accepted by Hasker 
when he was first making his case for mind, but the properties he now 
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attributes to mind seem to undercut them. Can a mind which is spatial 
and has energy also contain mental objects and processes? If mind is a field 
with energy and spatial location, are the qualities of milld Hasker wants to 
retain any more compatible with it than they are with the brain? 
Moreover, we must take a close look at what is essential about the unity 
of mind for Hasker. It is not merely that the mind must be an as an indi-
vidual, not a bundle, but it is essential that there be a common subject of 
awareness, some center which is capable of combining all the self's various 
experiences into one unified whole. If mind is a field, where is the essential 
center of awareness, the point at which all of the separate images and ideas 
are combined? How do we avoid the criticisms that Hasker made of the 
brain, namely that there is no place where the various experiences come 
together in a common center? 
In the sections that follow, I will argue that Hasker's view of the self is 
inadequate because it tries to combine contradictory elements into his con-
cept of mind - mind cannot contain qualia, have unity of awareness, 
rationality, intensionality, and act freely while at the same time being spa-
tial and an energy system. This incompatibility has been the very basis for 
mind-brain separation among western philosophers. 
1. Most dualists have held that minds are private, that mental states are 
inaccessible to public view. If minds have spatial location and use energy, 
does that not imply that they are subject to scrutiny by an external observ-
er, one armed with a mental energy detector? Certainly physical fields and 
their contents are publicly observable. It would seem that on Hasker's 
view an external observer could not only know that I am seeing green by 
observing my brain states, but also know what it is like for me to see green. 
Are we to abandon the view that mental states are private and make them 
publicly accessible? 
2. By making mind spatial and attributing energy to it, Hasker makes 
mind part of the world that is observable in principle by physical science. 
Cartesians and Hasker may agree that mind is known first of all by intro-
spection, secondly by inference in order to explain certain features of expe-
rience such as the unity of experience and mental causation of certain types 
of behavior of the body, but the Cartesian claims that mind itself lies out-
side the physical order, therefore cannot be analyzed by physical science 
and, equally importantly, cannot be located by scientists. By putting mind 
into the same spatial framework with brain and attributing energy to it, 
Hasker has made both the existence and nature of mind subject to direct 
confirmation by physical science. The existence of mind becomes refutable 
and the absence of any present physical evidence for Haskerian minds 
becomes a problem for Hasker, but not for Cartesians. 
3. Haskerian minds, both spatial and having energy, do not seem to be 
qualitatively different enough, as he has conceded when he conceded that 
one of the defects of his analogy is that fields cannot provide for "emer-
gence in the strong sense required for the properties of mind" (p 192). Can 
mental energy be thought to be any more colored or abstract or intensional 
than physical energy? Are we now to think of mental energy patterns 
which are yellow or green? The very differences that led philosophers to 
postulate the separate existence of mind seem to vanish once minds resem-
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ble brains this closely. 
4. Moreover, to have mind introducing energy to and subtracting ener-
gy from the brain reintroduces the conservation of energy problem that 
Hasker concedes Cartesians have solved.6 Hasker notes that Cartesian 
dualists escape the problem of conservation. "Why can't the soul register 
what is going on in the brain without absorbing energy from the brain? 
(What would the soul do with that energy, anyway?)" (p 151), making two 
points on behalf of Cartesians, that energy is not exchanged and the mind 
has no place for energy. He credits the Cartesian with realizing that psy-
cho-physical causation is not physical causation, but then he strangely 
makes it out to be like physical causation after all. He requires that energy 
flow back and forth from mind to brain, and he requires that mind have a 
place for energy. 
Hasker has few options. He can deny that conservation of energy holds 
for the physical world, or can claim that when energy is presently mea-
sured it includes both the energy of mind and the energy of brain, unbe-
knownst to contemporary scientists, or he can retain conservation for the 
physical world below the level of mind and claim that additions and sub-
tractions always balance each other, but in that case he has to provide some 
hidden hand to do the balancing. On this matter, Cartesians seem to be 
much better off. 
5. Hasker rejected brain theories, bundle theories and panpsychism 
because they break up the mind into pieces, thus are unable to provide for 
the unity of the self, and he admitted that one of the defects of his analogy 
is that it cannot provide for the kind of unity required for the self. It is also 
a problem that personal identity over time seems to be compromised as 
well. His claim is that the individual is continuous over time, "that the very 
same self now typing these words is the one that several years ago con-
ceived the plan for this book" (p 146). He claimed as an advantage of his 
view it allows that the field of consciousness is capable of being divided, 
thus is consistent with commissurotomy (brain-splitting) (p 193). At the 
very end of his book, he returns to this topic, saying that "emergent dual-
ism opens itself to questions about personal identity to which Cartesian 
dualism is immune." Complete fission, would result in "two persons who 
were 'successors' to the original, undivided person life" (p 234). 
These problems deserve more than a mere mention. Brain splitting pro-
duces two selves, both continuous with the pre-split self, each the author 
who typed the words and conceived the plan for this book. But can two 
numerically different people be the same person? And what happens 
should the fission be reversed? Do the two separate selves, each of which 
has its own history since duplication, and each of which is a separate cen-
ter of consciousness, now become one again? And what happens to the dif-
ferences in the fields that have resulted during the time they have existed 
separately? Cartesians may have trouble knowing what to say about cases 
like this, whether the soul continues to operate through only one half of the 
brain or whether it continues to use both halves. Given the interdepen-
dence of souls and bodies for which I will be arguing shortly, I do not 
think that the suggestion that God could create a new soul for the second 
body makes much sense, but whatever answer the Cartesian gives, it will 
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preserve numerical identity. 
He has acknowledged that one of the problems with his physical field 
analogy is that it cannot do justice to the unity of the person at one time 
but now it turns out that it cannot do justice to the notion of personal iden-
tity through time because it leads to the possibility that multiple persons 
might be the same person so far as personal identity is concerned. 
I am not suggesting that Hasker does not realize that some of these 
problems exist. After all he himself points that his analogy cannot provide 
for radical emergence, nor for teleology or libertarian freedom or for the 
subject of consciousness, but he has given us no guidance as to how these 
defects can be remedied. I have added further limitations, suggesting that 
when he makes mind spatial and provides energy to mind he undermines 
privacy, subjects mind to empirical confirmation or falsification, makes 
mind an unfit place to house qualia and mental properties, raises anew the 
conservation of energy problem, and undercuts personal identity. 
HASKER'S REJECTION OF CARTESIAN DUALISM 
Now what are his problems with the Cartesian and Thomistic forms of sub-
stance dualism, and can a better case be made for Cartesian dualism than he 
provides? Hasker does not, like many critics, reject those forms of dualism 
as unintelligible. Instead, he credits such dualists with having developed 
satisfactory answers to claims that interaction between Cartesian minds and 
bodies is unintelligible and impossible. He says of this argument that it 
"may well hold the all-time record for overrated objections to major philo-
sophical positions (p 150)." He dismisses objections based on violation of 
conservation of energy, and also on the "pairing problem," which is how to 
connect up Cartesian souls with bodies so as to enable causal interaction 
between them (p 151). Hasker allows the Cartesian the option of saying that 
God is responsible for the pairing. Examining other standard critiques of 
Cartesian dualism, Hasker says that objections to the intelligibility of dis-
embodied souls and of their identification have also been sufficiently 
answered and have an archaic flavor about them (p 208). His conclusion is 
that "once we have accepted epistemological fallibilism and given up our 
preoccupation with Cartesian demons, reasonable answers are not too diffi-
cult to find" (p 210). It seems to me that Hasker is right in crediting 
Cartesian dualism with answers to those objections. 
So the difficulties with Cartesian dualism are not logical, rather they are 
factual. The difficulties arise from alleged inconsistencies between what 
science tells us about the world and the Cartesian conception of mind. The 
major problems he raises are of two types, the first of which is the observ-
able continuity between human beings and other life forms. How are 
Cartesian souls to be made compatible with modem evolutionary theory? 
He could also have asked how Cartesian souls are incorporated into the 
individual's growth from sperm and egg. 
The second problem is the failure of Cartesians to explain the results of 
modem scientific discoveries about the brain and consciousness which, 
Hasker claims, suggest a much closer relationship that Hasker thinks 
would be expected if the Cartesian view were correct. 
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I do have some suggestions for strengthening Cartesian responses to 
these and other issues, but my comments fall far short of solving the prob-
lems he raises. His comments on brain dependence strike Cartesian dual-
ism at its most vulnerable point. I wish I could do better. 
1. With regard to the first objection, the point needs to be made that 
Cartesians cannot, as a matter of principle, take a definite position on when 
souls first emerge but must guess. Since souls are private they are not sub-
ject to observation by third parties, and introspection can tell us only when 
we first became aware that we exist as selves, i.e. became self-conscious, and 
we cannot rule out periods of existence prior to the one we now remember, 
both in our present embodiment and perhaps earlier versions. It would be 
perfectly appropriate for Cartesians to maintain that we live many times in 
the course of the soul's progress, born anew at the character level reached in 
the previous life but with memories of that existence wiped out. The view 
goes back to Plato, but is not normally adopted by Christian theists. 
To the question of when souls emerge in the life of the individual or in 
the life of the species, Cartesians can only provide best guesses, making 
inferences from behavior. They are pretty sure that other human beings 
have minds, and that maybe other advanced animals do, but possibly 
mind goes all the way down the animate scale, possibly even to inanimate 
life. Given his views about the self, I am somewhat puzzled that Hasker 
does not himself take a position on when the soul emerges in the course of 
evolution or in the life of the individual, since the matter should be one for 
science to settle. If mind is spatial and has energy and is subject to empiri-
cal investigation then surely definite answers to these questions are possi-
ble on Hasker's view. 
2. The second group of difficulties results from the close dependence of 
the mind on the brain and what goes on in the brain. Hasker seems to 
think that Cartesian dualists should be troubled by mounting evidence that 
mind and brain are closely related, for example when the evidence indi-
cates that the brain does information processing (p 155). He also seems sur-
prised that Cartesians would hold that the body sets limits on what the 
embodied mind can do. I do not see why either claim would be embar-
rassing to Cartesians, granting, as Hasker concedes they might, that the 
Cartesian response might be that the mind has all its powers when disem-
bodied and only has difficulty using them when using the body (pp 156-7). 
I suspect he really does not give full credit to the Cartesian position on cor-
relation between minds and brains. 
That the soul uses the brain to compute or do information processing, or 
invents machines to do it better, should present no more serious a prob-
lem to a Cartesian than that the soul uses bodily habits when it drinks from 
a cup, or walks without thinking which foot to put forward next. 
Cartesians are not troubled by the fact that computers can be constructed 
to perform mechanical tasks like information processing and solving prob-
lems of modem logic, saving the mind the task of doing these computa-
tions. They do have to draw the line on reasoning and semantic processes, 
which involve connections of meaning, not syntactical form, but do not 
have to fear mechanical processes of whatever complexity. Modem dual-
ists should welcome the news that all conscious activities including thoughts 
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and memories have physical correlates in the brain. If this is so, they have a 
ready explanation for why failures in body function hamper the exercise of 
the powers of the embodied mind. 
It may be that some Cartesians think that there are activities of the 
embodied mind which are not accompanied by brain processes, but they 
do not need to think so. No Cartesian should be troubled even if the correla-
tions are so tight that a future scientist will be able to know that Smith is 
thinking x without asking Smith what he is thinking, since she will still not 
know what it is like for Smith to think x, or be able to find that thought in 
Smith's brain. For the scientist to learn what it is like for Smith to see x, she 
would have to be Smith. Even Smith could not find his experience of what 
it is like to think x by observing his own brain. 
Strict correlation should not bother a Cartesian, should the fact that 
aspects of the mental life are affected by states of the brain cause insur-
mountable problems? Let us look at that problem. The moves Cartesian 
dualists have made in response to the dependence (I would call it the corre-
lation) problem are well known, but can be improved. Cartesian dualists 
need to appreciate more fully the fact that souls have structures which are 
shaped by their interactions with brains.7 A developed soul is not a blank 
slate but contains a set of characteristic responses, a web of beliefs and 
desires, all of which have been shaped by its experiences. First person expe-
rience tells me that when 1 choose to act contra-causally or encounter a fact 
which is inconsistent with my previous beliefs, 1 encounter mental resis-
tance. 1 normally do what I most strongly desire to do, however I can, and 
sometimes do, choose to resist my strongest desire and do my duty instead, 
but 1 have to overcome internal opposition to do so. Similarly, when beliefs 
clash, there is an internal struggle within the sout and, when memories 
clash, I have to search my other memories to determine which of the con-
flicting memories is correct. Dualists sometimes write as though what is 
involved in searching memories or changing beliefs or resisting strong 
desires is merely a conflict between soul and brain. Yes, the soul does 
encounter resistance in the brain - the resistance of neural pathways 
which have been structured by previous actions has to be overcome - but 
surely 1 introspect struggle within my soul as well. Since the structure of the 
developing soul and the structure of its brain are correlated and change as 
the two aspects of the self interact with each other, a soul should be very 
dependent on a proper functioning body for the exercise of those capacities 
which involve the brain, and if we assume one to one correlation between 
mental activities and brain processes that would mean that the soul 
depends upon the brain for smooth functioning of all its capacities. That 
does not mean that the soul cannot function without its brain but that its 
functioning would be impaired by a mal-functioning brain. Just as the soul 
has to cause the brain to change its typical response when the soul decides 
to act contra-causally, so it could not give voice to its thoughts if some 
defect in brain functioning blocked the expression of those thoughts. Wilder 
Penfield provides an example of a case in which a conscious mind is still 
functioning fully but is unable to communicate its thoughts as long as the 
brain is temporarily paralyzed by electrical current, but resumes its ability 
to speak when the current is removed.8 
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There has been much unjustified talk about body switching in the philo-
sophicalliterature as though a Cartesian soul could operate just any body, 
even a tree perhaps, but surely this is not the case. If we think of the soul and 
brain as structuring each other as their relationship develops, severe restric-
tions would be imposed upon the kinds of brains a soul could manage and 
on what it could do with various brains. To be able to operate a brain effec-
tively, a soul would have to use a brain very much like the one which it has 
structured. A differently structured brain would inevitably cause problems 
for the soul such as by producing false memories or by producing habitual 
responses which go counter to what the soul's former body provided. 
Not just any body would do, for efficient switches in this life or for res-
urrection bodies. Think of the problems a Chinese soul would have in try-
ing to communicate through an American body, a body which produces 
neither the right sounds nor the right tones! Similarly, a damaged brain 
would very much affect what a soul could accomplish in communicating 
with others or orienting itself with relation to other bodies and souls. 
Contrary to Hasker's comment, I do not find it at all surprising that a 
Cartesian would find embodiment "a burden and limitation on the natural 
powers of the soul" (p 157). Embodiment is both essential for the soul's 
communication with other souls and a burden and limitation. 
So, once the soul starts interacting with a particular body, they start to 
affect each other, each modifying the other structurally. If we consider 
soul-brain interaction to involve two substances, limited by each other and 
modifying each other so that each acquires a unique shape, we are poten-
tially able to say a great deal about pairing problems and why, when a 
body has limited capacities or portions of the brain are damaged, or the 
arteries harden, the soul is hampered in its ability to use its body to act or 
express itself. I am not claiming that we know what to say about all the 
cases Hasker introduces. 
Since the time of Plato bodies have been thought of as prison houses, but 
this is not all that Cartesians have to say about the relation of body to soul. 
That the embodied soul depends upon its structured body to enable it to use 
that body properly constitutes a burden and limitation, but that the soul has 
a body to use also gives it the possibility of communicating with other souls. 
For Cartesians, souls are private and it is impossible for a soul to communi-
cate with another soul except through its body. Also, Cartesians claim that 
souls need bodies not only for purposes of communication with other souls 
but also as instruments for soul development. Without bodies a soul would 
be limited to its own thoughts and desires and could not interact with other 
souls and so develop its own character. It is not unusual these days for a con-
temporary theistic dualist to expect that survival involves some kind of reim-
bodiment. Reimbodiment then will be needed for the same reasons that a 
soul needs a body now - to enable souls to interact with other souls. 
A final point is that the relationships of mind and brain are complex, not 
just one way, and there are indications that mental processes sometimes 
affect the physical in ways that Hasker's model would not lead us to 
expect. The conscious mind is not apparently functioning when the brain 
goes to sleep, and yet introspection tells us that the mind can wake the 
brain when suffering from bad dreams or can set the time for awakening 
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before falling asleep. The conscious mind at times awakens with answer 
to problems that it had been considering prior to going to sleep, and the 
conscious mind can remember dreams. Also the mind can dramatically 
affect brain functioning by going into trance and it is not unusual to 
encounter claims that the mind of a person or healer can alter the way the 
brain and body function. Admittedly Cartesians do not have answers to 
all of the problems Hasker raises about the mind's apparent dependence 
on bodies, and Hasker is right to ask them to address these problems, but 
the hard cases are not all on one side. 
CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
I have tried to give a sympathetic reading of William Hasker's The 
Emergent Self endorsing his case for the need to go beyond materialism and 
property dualism to some theory of consciousness which does justice not 
only to qualia, mental contents, intentions and rationality, but also to the 
unity of consciousness (both synchronic and diachronic), contra-causal 
freedom and the possibility of survival of the death of the physical brain. 
Hasker is right in what he denies, but I have raised some major questions 
about what he affirms, claiming that there are disparities between what he 
wants to affirm and some of the actual implications of his views about the 
nature of consciousness. I want to suggest that Cartesian dualism, suitably 
modified, is much more adequate to express what Hasker wants to affirm 
than the view he offers. 
I have also tried to claim that Cartesian dualists can make a stronger 
case for the dependence of minds on bodies than simply using God to pro-
vide the explanation for pairing, and have used the notion of the struc-
tured soul to deepen our understanding of the dependence of mind upon 
its particular brain. While my explanations are not fully satisfactory in 
dealing with the dependence problems Hasker raises, the concept of the 
interrelationship between the structures of the soul and body do take us a 
substantial part of the way. 
Jaegwon Kim has ventured the opinion that if contemporary philoso-
phers of mind want to save mental causation they may have to look at sub-
stantival dualism, confessing that "for most of us, dualism is uncharted ter-
ritory, and we have little knowledge of what possibilities and dangers lurk 
in this dark cavem."9 Contemporary philosophers of mind have been too 
dismissive of Cartesian dualism. I recommend their reading Hasker, but 
then moving forward to a more substantive dualism, one which can really 
provide a self with the properties that Hasker recognizes are needed. 
Emeritus, University of Delaware 
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